Using Indonesian firm census data, the paper investigates the impacts of minimum wages on employment and wages in Indonesia in the period of 1993-2006. The paper finds that minimum wages have significant and negative employment effects in small firms, but not in large firms.
I. Introduction
Most countries around the world have some form of minimum wages. Policymakers have often argued that rises in the minimum wage increase the income of low-income workers, and therefore can be used as a tool to reduce poverty and inequality. Some policymakers also argue that wage increases can improve workers' productivity (Levine, 1992; Raff and Summers, 1987) because they lead increases in work effort, reductions in job turnover and more on-the-job training (Katz, 1987) . However, there is no evidence that exogenously imposed minimum wages lead to higher worker productivity. Instead, several studies find that increases in minimum wages without commensurate increases in labor productivity could lead to job losses in the formal sector. The main reason provided for this argument is that poor workers-the people expected to benefit from the policy-are more likely to be pushed out of formal employment because they often have limited skills and low productivity, and thus tend to be among the first to be laid off when minimum wages increase.
Theoretically, whether changes in minimum wage lead to higher incomes or job losses depends on where existing wages are set relative to worker's marginal product of labor (MPL). If existing wages are set much below the MPL, a moderate increase in minimum wages can benefit workers. The case of a monopsonistic firm (think of a large manufacturing plant in a small town) is an example. Because of its market power over hiring and firing workers, a monopsonistic firm can depress wages and generate additional profit at the cost of the workers' income. A moderate rise in minimum wage would bring the floor wage up closer to the MPL.
This would not cause job losses because the firm still profits from hiring workers, even at a higher wage rate (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995) . On the other hand, in the case of a competitive labor market where existing wages equal the MPL, a minimum wage increase will lead to job losses as firms have to cut back labor and raise the MPL to equate the newly imposed minimum wage.
As many developing countries, particularly in East Asia, are considering adopting minimum wage laws or reforming their existing minimum wage systems, it is important to investigate the issue in a developing country context. Developing countries are potentially very different from developed countries in terms of labor market conditions. Labor markets in many developing countries are usually characterized as being more segmented, filled with less skilled labor, disproportionate ratio of male-to-female workers, large gender wage gaps, and dominated by small, informal firms. Unfortunately, due to the lack of good data, firm-level studies about the impact of minimum wages in developing countries are rather limited.
This paper uses data from Indonesia industry survey (SI) to investigate if minimum wage changes affect firms' wages, employment, and their labor's educational composition. Indonesia is an interesting country for the analysis: it has a long history of minimum wage law; there are substantial variations of the minimum wage across time and provinces; and Indonesia's manufacturing census data are very good, with detailed questions and broad coverage.
II. Selected Literature and Contribution
There is an extensive literature on the impact of minimum wages on employment. 2 Existing studies in developed countries provide conflicting evidence. For example, Burkhauser, Couch and Wittenburg (2000) and Baker, Benjamin and Stanger (1999) find that higher minimum wages in the United States have negative impacts on employment. They use a regional measure of employment and regress it on minimum wage changes. This approach however, likely suffers from omitted variable problems because one can argue that some national or regional economic conditions can affect both regional employment and minimum wages, and hence bias the resultant estimates.
A study by Card and Kruger (1994) tries to overcome the shortcomings in previous studies. In their paper they use difference-in-difference approach by comparing employment on U.S. fastfood restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, two neighboring states which have different minimum wages. A special feature about the restaurants is that they are located very close to the state border and arguably under very similar economic conditions (of course except from their minimum wages). Such an empirical approach likely reduces the problem of unobserved economic conditions affecting both employment and minimum wage laws. Their study results
show that there is no negative association between minimum wage and employment.
There is a limited, albeit rapidly growing, number of empirical studies measuring the impact of minimum wages on employment and other welfare dimensions in developing countries. The evidence that is currently available tends to find heterogeneous impacts of minimum wage hikes on employment; though the effect is almost always negative in Latin American countries where 2 See Neumark and Wascher (2008) for a comprehensive overview.
the minimum wage level is high relative to the overall wage distribution (Kristensen and Cunningham, 2006) . In East Asia for example, Nguyen (2011) finds that in Vietnam minimum wage increases led to a decrease in formal employment among low-wage formal sector workers.
Similarly, Bell (1997) finds that in Colombia, where the minimum wage was close to the average wage, and in Mexico, where the minimum wage was below market clearing, rises led to negative impacts. Maloney and Nunez (2004) also find a negative employment effect in both formal and self-employed sectors in Colombia. And Ginding and Terrell (2007) also report a negative impact on employment in the formal sector in Costa Rica.
The issue of minimum wage in Indonesia has received some attention in the recent decade. Rama (2001) , one of the earliest studies for Indonesia, uses repeated cross-section labor force surveys (Sakernas) to create province-level panel data and measure the impact of minimum wages on firms. It finds a negative employment effect for small firms (those with less than 20 workers) but a positive effect for medium-sized and large ones. Islam and Nazara (2000) , Suryahadi et al (2003) and Pratomo (2011) also aggregate Sakernas to generate province-level data. In general, they find a negative impact of minimum wages on employment. Nevertheless, since the variation of minimum wages is also at the province level, this approach with provincelevel data may suffer from the omitted variable problem that was mentioned above. 3 And most recently, Magruder (2011) found positive effects of the rise in minimum wages on employment in some sectors-though not in tradable manufacturing-in Indonesia in the early 1990's.
To overcome this problem, more recent studies analyze firm-level data. Alatas and Cameron (2008) adopt Card and Kruger's (1994) approach for firms in greater Jakarta. They focus on clothing, textiles, footwear, and leather firms during 1990 trough 1996. They find a negative employment impact of minimum wages on production workers in small firms, but not in large firms. Harrison and Scorse (2010) look at the impact of anti-sweatshop campaigns on large real wage increases in foreign-owned, exporting firms in textiles, footwear and apparel sectors. In addition, they find that a 10% increase in real minimum wages, on average, reduces production worker employment by 1.2%. They also find reduced investment, falling profits, and increased probability of going out of business (at least in the formal sector) for smaller firms, but not for large firms. Recently, Hallward-Driemeier et al (2010) use both firm level and labor force data to show that minimum wage increases reduce gender wage gaps for workers who completed junior high school, but that the gap worsens for workers who did not complete primary school.
The analysis in this paper takes a step further to investigate the impact of minimum wages on employment in manufacturing by focusing on both production workers 4 and non-production workers in the sector, workers with different education levels, and gender profile. Employment effect on non-production workers has been ignored in the previous literature. There is a perception that non-production workers are unaffected because they are typically high-skilled workers such as managers and researchers, who are less susceptible to changes in minimum wages. However, the analysis here shows that in Indonesia (and probably in most developing countries), a large proportion of non-production workers are low-skilled workers performing menial tasks in factories such as cleaners, drivers, guards, and support tasks for production workers. They are found to be even more severely affected by minimum wage hikes than production workers. Although non-production workers account for a smaller fraction of the manufacturing labor force, they do account for a much larger fraction in the services sector (and hence in the entire economy), thus making the findings from this paper very relevant to the economy as a whole.
The analysis also looks at employment changes by the levels of education of workers, and gender to identify the groups that are most severely affected, and to see if firms substitute lowskilled, less-educated workers with skilled, more-educated ones. This has hardly been examined before although the issue is of the utmost importance, especially when policymakers make increases in wage levels with the objective to benefit poorer, often low skilled workers. The paper finds that workers with low levels of education are the hardest hit my minimum wage increases, especially if they are female; and workers with high school education level or above do not seem adversely affected. Methodologically, the analysis uses firm-level data, which allows for the panel data analysis with firm fixed effects. By looking for changes within a firm, the paper is able to mitigate the concerns about omitted variable and endogeneity problems.
As discussed further, given that minimum wages change across province and across time, a standard approach is to run OLS with time and province fixed effects to capture non-time varying province characteristics-such as provincial infrastructure or regulations-that might affect both employment and the minimum wages. For example, a well-managed province, seeing rising employment, might decide to increase minimum wages. However, this does not address another potential omitted variable problem at the firm level. For example, some firms (or a group of them) might have connections or receive some favorable treatments from the government. These factors help the firms expand and at the same time give them some voice in the minimum wage decision process. Having firm fixed effects captures the time-invariant component of these connections and treatments. As shown, the results flip from pooled OLS with province fixed effect to panel regression with firm fixed effects.
A caveat worth highlighting is that by looking at manufacturing firms, this paper focuses on formal employment, and not on employment in the informal sector, which accounts for approximately 63% of the employed workforce in Indonesia (Indonesia Job Reports, 2010) .
Previous studies show that indeed, workers who lose their formal employment do not necessarily become unemployed but rather they are likely to go into the informal sector (either in self-employment or working in an informal firm) (Loayza, Oviedo, Serven, 2005; Perry et. al, 2007; Nguyen, 2011) . There are potentially labor movements and other types of interactions between formal and informal sectors. For instance, using district-level data, Comola and de Mello (2011) find that an increase in minimum wages is associated with job losses in the formal sector and job gains in the informal sector 5 .
III. Context and the Minimum Wage Institution
Indonesia is a large, populous South East Asian country. Its population is 238 million, which makes it the world's fourth most populous country. Indonesia is the largest economy in South East Asia, the world's 18 th largest by nominal gross domestic product (GDP), and a member of Bank, 2010) .
Men are largely overrepresented in the Indonesian labor force; female labor participation in 2009 is 52%, and women are disproportionately represented amongst the lowest paid (Cuevas et.al. 2009 ). The Indonesian workforce is increasingly becoming more educated, but is still relatively less so compared to neighboring countries (World Bank, 2010 Similarly, tertiary enrollment is low by regional standards. In the manufacturing sector, the focus of this paper, the vast majority of the workforce only has at most senior high school education ( Figure 1 ).
Figure 1: Education composition of production and non-production workers, 2006
Source: Indonesia Industry Survey (SI)
The minimum wage legislation in Indonesia was first introduced in Indonesia in the early 1970s for those working in mainly urban areas. According to the 2003 Law on Manpower Affairs regulation, minimum wages were established solely to meet the adequate living standard needs of a single worker, and the adequate living standard should be derived from a yearly survey conducted at a provincial level. 6 The law also establishes, in general terms, that when defining the minimum wage consideration should be given to productivity and economic growth , as well as to the condition of the labor market, the level of economic development, income per capita, and the capacity to pay and sustainability of employers.
Different minimum wages are set for different provinces to take into account their different living costs. The main variation of minimum wages is at the provincial level (see Figure 2 ). Until and employer representatives were usually government appointees (Suryahadi, 2003) . Since 2001, the setting of minimum wage levels was transferred to governors and some cases mayors, who also receive recommendations from councils in their respective areas.
Presently, the variation of minimum wage levels across provinces is substantial. For example, Figure 2 shows normalized real minimum wages across 26 Indonesia's provinces in 2006. Note that the real minimum wages are calculated as the nominal wages divided by provincial CPI, hence they already reflect provinces' different living costs. Nevertheless, the differences between the real minimum wages across provinces remain large; for instance, the level in Jakarta, the capital and largest economic center, is twice as high as the level in East Java. Minimum wages in Indonesia also vary markedly over time. Figure 3 shows the evolution of nominal and real minimum wages in Jakarta from 1993 to 2006. Interest in minimum wage as an instrument to affect workers welfare grew over time, and in late 1980s, after pressure from international markets about low wages, workers exploitation and labor standards in Indonesia, minimum wage levels began to rise. As reported by Sutyahadi et. al (2001) , in the first half of the 1990s minimum wages tripled in nominal terms and more than doubled in real terms in a period of five years. During the second half of the 1990s nominal minimum wages continued to increase but not in real terms due to high levels of inflation. Then the crisis hit, the exchange rate depreciated and the real minimum wage declined substantially. In 1998, the real minimum wages declined as much as 30% (see Figure 3 ), although the nominal wage steadily climbed.
After the crisis, minimum wages slowly re-emerged as a key element of economic and social policies. Nominal wage increase gradually picked up. By 2001, the real wage was back at the precrisis level, but since then has remained flat. Compared to other growing economies in East Asia, the monthly minimum wage relative to the countries' GDP per capita is higher in Indonesia than in Thailand or China 7 , two competing economies. Both Vietnam and the Philippines have higher ratios, while Malaysia still has no statutory minimum wage. 7 It is worth noting that the minimum wage in China has been increasing rapidly in recent years and the ratio may be the same or higher than Indonesia in 2012. 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Real minimum wage Nominal minimum wage
IV. Data and Descriptive Analysis
The main data source used in the analysis is the annual manufacturing census survey of Indonesia (or the Survei Industri In terms of employment, the survey divides a firm's employment into those of production and of non-production workers, along with the total wage bill for each category, from which it is easy to calculate average wages for production workers and non production workers. For four years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2006 , the survey also has information about the exact educational compositions of its workforce. This information is used extensively in subsequent econometric analysis. Minimum wage data are obtained from BPS. A summary table of variables used in the paper is in the Appendix.
The paper also uses, albeit selectively, data derived from the National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas). The Susenas is an annual multi-purpose household level survey that collects individual and household level information, including wages as well as various socio-economic, demographic, and labor characteristics of individuals and households. Comparable waves of this survey are available; however, given that the analysis presented in this paper focuses on firms, the data from Susenas is only used to better understand the results and contextualize the discussion.
The analysis starts by looking at how high minimum wage is relative to workers' wage rates. In order to do so, ideally one would like to have detailed wage distributions within a firm.
However, since the data only provides the numbers of production and non-production workers and their respective wage bills, the calculation focuses on within firm average wages. Here minimum wages are compared to the average wage ratio across firms. Figure 4 shows the 8 The SI data track establishments, rather than firms. A recent PBS study has suggested that less than 5% of establishments in the Manufacturing Census are owned by a multi-establishment firm (see Hallward-Driemeier et al, 2010 for a discussion). For this reason, we will use the terms -firms‖ and -plants‖ interchangeably throughout the paper. 9 There are more than 11000 new firms that first appeared in the dataset in 2006. Since we will utilize panel data with firm fixed effects, these firms drop out in our analysis. country average of the minimum wage-firm average wage ratio. It fluctuates from about 0.085
in 1993 to about 0.177 in 2006. The ratio peaked in 1997, but slid slightly during the Asia crisis, before peaking again in 2004. After 2004 however, the ratio dropped sharply, indicating that nominal wages did not rise as fast as the nominal minimum wages did. An in-depth look at minimum wage to firm average wage ratio across firms in 2006 reveals that for the majority of firms, the ratio is at the low end ( Figure 5 ). About 76% of all firms have a ratio less than 0.1 (i.e. the minimum wage is less than 10% of the firm's average wage).
Interestingly, for about 0.73% of them, the minimum wage is larger than the firm's average wage. For these firms, compliance with minimum wage law might be an issue. This paper focuses on the asymmetric impacts of minimum wages on small firms and large firms. Following Alatas and Cameron (2008) , small firms are defined as firms that always have 150 workers or less, and large firms are those that always have more than 150 workers. In the data, there are about 27,000 small firms and about 4,500 large firms that appear in the time period evaluated (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) .
Small firms and large firms in Indonesia have fundamentally different characteristics. Small firms are more numerous, overwhelmingly domestic 10 , have lower productivity levels, lower wages, and are slightly more concentrated in labor-intensive manufacturing 11 (see Table 1 ). An in-depth look through the distribution of firm size reveals that firm size is heavily skewed towards small. About 50% of firms only have 20-40 workers. In 2006, out of 29,000 firms, there are only 802 firms with more than 1,000 workers and 38 firms have more than 5,000. The distribution of firm size in 2006 is presented in Figure 6 (in order to see the distribution clearly, only firms with less than 1,000 workers are included). The detailed specification is as follows:
log(Y it ) = β 0 + β 1 log(MinWage it ) + β X X it + F i + T t + ε it
where i denotes firm i, and t denotes year t. Y it is the dependent variable of interest. MinWage is the real minimum wage (which varies across provinces and across time). X it is a set of control variables. F i is the firm fixed effects, and T t is the time dummies. One of the concerns is that the crisis years 1997 and 1998 may distort the regression results. In some of the regressions, the crisis years are dropped for robustness check, but results remain consistent with little difference with and without these years.
The analysis relies on the assumption that firms in general take minimum wages as exogenous and respond to them. Since minimum wages are set at the national and provincial level, the vast majority of firms (with perhaps a very few exceptions) have little bargaining power over how the minimum wages are set. It is true that they can form associations and trade groups to lobby the national and provincial government; alternatively the government can voluntarily set minimum wage requirements in response to firms' conditions. As a result, a potential endogeneity issue might arise. However, based on in-country consultations on the practice of minimum wage setting it is unlikely that the issue is important for the following reasons; first, Indonesian minimum wage counsels are tripartite, including representatives from employers, employees and the government. This implies that the government seeks to strike a balance between workers and firms' benefit and therefore does not entirely accommodate firms' wage demands. Second, because of so much heterogeneity among firms, it is impossible for one or even a few minimum wage levels to respond to every single firm, thus one can safely assume that there is a high level of exogeneity in minimum wage setting.
As discussed briefly in the introduction, having firm fixed effects further reduces endogeneity at firm level. Given that minimum wage levels change across province and across time, a standard approach is to run OLS with time and province fixed effects to capture non-time varying province characteristics that might affect both employment and the minimum wages. However, there is another potential omitted variable problem at the firm level. For example, some firms (or a group of them) might have connections to the government or favorable treatments from it, thus helping them expand, and at the same time have lobbying power in the minimum wage decision process. Having firm fixed effects will capture the time-invariant component of this connection. Indeed, the results generally flip from pooled OLS with province fixed effect to panel regression with firm fixed effects. In the pooled OLS regressions, the associations between minimum wages and employment are positive and significant, and it is true for both production and non-production workers. With panel regressions with firm fixed effects, the impacts of minimum wages on both types of employment turn negative, and significant.
Four regression estimation tables are shown in this section. The first group focuses on the impact on production worker employment. The second group focuses on the impact on nonproduction worker employment. The third group focuses on the impact of the composition of workers' education, and the last group focuses on the impact on real wage firms have to pay their workers.
a. Employment of Production Workers and Non-production Workers
In the first group, we run a set of panel data regressions with firms fixed effects and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is log of production worker employment. In the second group of regressions, the focus is on employment of non-production workers. As mentioned, there is little focus on this group of workers in the literature, likely because nonproduction workers constitute a smaller fraction of the labor force in manufacturing. Indeed in the data used for this analysis, the total number of non-production workers is about one-fifth of production workers', and this is stable for the entire period from 1993-2006. However, household data from Susenas shows that the estimated share of non-production workers (ages 15-65) in the manufacturing sector in 2006 is non-trivial, about 47%. From the total, most are engaged in basic tasks and only 12% are engaged in non-basic tasks such as management, sales, or administration.
Once again, the estimation approach uses panel data with firm fixed effects and year fixed effects to capture unobservable firms' non-time-varying characteristics and national macroeconomic shocks. The dependent variable is log of non-production worker employment.
Same set of control variables, and a similar set of regressions as previous estimations. Table 3 summarizes the results. Results show that in general, a higher minimum wage has a significant and negative impact on employment of non-production workers. A 10% increase in real minimum wages leads to a 0.56% decline in employment. The negative impacts of minimum wages on these types of workers are even more pronounced than impacts on production workers, particularly in small firms. The percentage decline observed is almost double compared to the results for production workers. This is initially surprising because conventional wisdom is that non-production workers are generally more educated than production workers, and therefore should be less vulnerable to changes in minimum wages. However, despite the fact that a subset of nonproduction workers have high levels of education, a larger subset of non-production workers have low levels of education, indicating that there is large variability in the level of education of non-production workers.
Household data also confirms this point. There are at least three distinct occupation categories among non-production workers in manufacturing: management and administrative staff, sales people, and workers performing basic task. As expected, of the three occupations, workers in the management and administrative category have higher levels of education (only 20% have less than high school completed). On the other hand, about 40% of sales people and 70% of workers performing basic tasks have not completed high school (Figure 7 ). Differentiating between the three distinct occupations encompassed in the non-production category of workers is important because as subsequent results show, it turns out that nonproduction workers with lower levels of education-junior and senior high school education or lower-are hit hardest by increases in the minimum wage. Figure 8 , estimated on a properly weighted sample using a kernel density method, shows that non-production workers in the manufacturing sector performing basic tasks earn low wages (over half earn at or below the vertical line, which represents a hypothetical national minimum wage line 13 ) and as a result account for the majority of job losses. This is largely explained by the fact that they have low skill levels (primary education or less) and perform non-essential tasks in the factories, thus making them extremely vulnerable to wage hikes; Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix show the wage variability (using kernel density estimates) by education level of non-production and productions workers separately, across all sectors of the economy. 13 The vertical line represents an average of all sub-national minimum wage lines (logged) in the country. There are about 28 different lines, and these range from as low as 12.87 in East Java to as high as 13.62 in West Irian Jaya, Aceh and Jakarta. Table A3 in the appendix presents the results obtained from pooled OLS regressions with province and time fixed effects. Similar to the case of production workers, the results show a positive impact of minimum wages on non-production employment. Within a province, a 10% increase in minimum wages causes a 2.3% increase in non-production employment. The contrasting results between these and those from the panel regressions with firm fixed effects suggest omitted variable problems exist at the firm level.
b. Asymmetric Impacts of Minimum Wages on Large Firms and Small Firms
It is critical to understand why minimum wages hurt worker employment in small firms but not in large firms. Perhaps, wages in small firms are lower, and thus, in response to a higher minimum wage, small firms have to cut employment (probably to raise the MPL, assuming decreasing marginal productivity). For large firms, it may well be that the wage rates are also close to the MPL, but if the MPL is high in large firms (due to extensive use of capital for example), a sensible increase in minimum wage should not have a significant impact on larger firms' employment. Data confirm that the average wage of workers in small firms is significantly smaller than wages of workers in large firms (see Table 1 and Figure 9) . The difference is much more pronounced among non-production workers; average non-production wages in large firms are at least twice as high as wages in small firms. It is important to understand why it is that workers in large firms get paid higher salaries. One reason could be related to different skill levels (proxied by their educational attainment).
However, there is not a wide educational gap between workers in large firms and small firms, especially among production workers. Among non-production workers however, the percentage of workers with at least bachelor education is twice as high in large firms as in small firms (16.1% compared to 8.7%, in 2006). This probably accounts for a part of the wage discrepancy between non-production wages in large firms and small firms ( Figure 10 ). Another potential reason is that large firms might have a higher degree of mechanization, which explains why the value added per worker in large firms is higher, and workers in large firms are better paid. The data seem to confirm this conjecture: in large firms, the estimated value of machine capital per worker is much larger. For a few years where the estimate value of machine capital is available, the estimate for firms in Jakarta area show that estimated value of machine capital per worker of large firms is 1.4 to 16 times larger than that of small firms.
c. Educational Compositions of Production and Non-production Workers
The third group of regressions helps look at the change in education composition in response to minimum wage. There are several questions of interest here. First, which groups of workers are most hurt by changes in the minimum wage? Second, do firms react to higher minimum wages by firing lower skilled workers and replacing them with higher skilled ones? Ideally, one would like to have detailed skill portfolios of workers in the firm data for a more precise analysis. However, since the data are not available, estimates use workers' education as a proxy for workers' skills.
The focus of this part of the analysis is on small firms because they are where the majority of the workforce is, and where there are interesting dynamics. Employment of production and non-production workers is analyzed separately. For each group of workers, the analysis measures percentage changes of the following education categories: at most primary education;
junior high and senior high; high school; at least bachelor 14 .
The analysis starts with employment of production workers. Table 4 shows the detailed analysis.
All variables, primary, juniorseniorhigh, highschool and bachelor are log of production workers that have at most primary education, junior and (incomplete) senior high school education, high school education, and at least bachelor education, respectively. Similar to the previous estimations, these are regressed against the log of real minimum wage, and then estimations are augmented with the standard control variables. Note again that the regressions are for small firms. 15
14 Data on education of the workforce is available only in four years : 1995, 1996, 1997, 2006. 15 Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix presents the results from pooled OLS regressions with province and year fixed effects. Results shows that production workers with lower levels of education (senior high and below) are hit hardest with an increase in minimum wage. Within a firm, a 10% increase in minimum wage causes a 2.3% decline of the number of workers with primary education or lower, and a 1.65% decline in the number of workers with junior high or senior high school education. Note that the decline among workers with primary education is higher. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the percentage decline for both categories are much larger than the total decline -as much as 5 to 6 times (recall that for small firms, the average percentage decline of all production workers is 0.36%). On the other hand, production workers with high school degree and above do not seem to be impacted by changes in minimum wage. For non-production workers, only workers with junior high school or senior high school education are negatively affected. A 10% increase in minimum wage causes their employment to shrink by 1.78%. This is almost doubled the average decline, and higher than the decline of production workers with the same level of education. As mentioned above, these jobs are not managerial or research positions, instead, they are likely to be menial jobs in the factories.
There is no evidence of labor substitution from less educated workers to more educated workers; instead, only less educated workers are let go.
e. Employment of Male and Female Workers
The fourth group of regressions focuses on the heterogeneity of impacts on employment by gender. The question of interest is whether a rise in minimum wages attracts broader female participation to the formal labor force in the manufacturing sector. As shown before, of all working-age women only 52% of them were actively working or looking for work in 2006; this is low compared to male participation in the country (86%). Time-use surveys from around the world reveal that women are largely responsible for housework and raising children (Miranda, 2011) . As a result of the double burden some studies conclude that women's reservation wage in many cases is higher than what the market is willing to pay them, keeping them out of the labor force. Recent evidence on the other hand shows that many women, especially among lower economic quintiles, lower their reservation wage and enter the labor force to finance basic expenditures of having children (Priebe, 2010) . Thus, one can argue that a rise in the minimum wage could potentially attract women to the labor market.
This section of the analysis explores the impact of the minimum wage on women, especially in small firms, where most of the job losses take place. Four items are measured here: employment of male production workers, of female production workers, of male non-production workers, and of female non-production workers. Table 6 shows the detailed analysis. The dependent variables are log of employment of the four categories; and like in previous sections the same control variables and panel fixed effects approach are used. The results show that for non-production employment, a rise in minimum wage disproportionately hurts female workers. They bear most of the burden of job losses. The negative impact on female non-production workers is large, statistically significant and robust.
A 10% increase in minimum wage leads to 0.6-0.7% decline in female non-production employment in small firms. The impact of minimum wage on male non-production workers is negative, with a smaller coefficient, but not statistically significant. For production workers, the job losses tend to be more equally split between males and females.
Female Production Production Production Production Non Prod Non Prod Non Prod Non Prod
Minimum wage -0.04 *** -0.0394 ** -0.0448 ** -0.0498 * -0.0381 -0.0409 -0.0638 *** -0.0696 ** (0.0157) (0.0187) (0.0212) (0.0261) (0.0241) (0.0291) (0.0235) (0.0296) Firm age 0.0876 *** 0.0735 *** 0.0761 *** 0.0624 *** (0.00716) (0.0103) (0.0113) (0.0113) Foreign 0.000847 ** -0.000371 0.0017 *** 0.00142 *** (0.000355) (0.000581) (0.000497) (0.000419) Export 0.00035 0.000636 *** 0.000352 ** 0.0005 *** (0.000104) *** (0.000137) (0.000161) (0.000157) Government 0.000151 -9.93e-05 0.000901 *** There are various reasons why minimum wage hikes affect women more than men. First, in many countries women earn between 70 to 80 percent the wages of men for similar work (Haussman et al, 2010) . This indicates that employers do not perceive (and reward) women's contribution equal to men 16 . Second, women are often more constrained by life-cycle events (e.g. marriage, childrearing, elderly care) than men so their opportunity cost is sometimes higher than their equilibrium wage. This is less of a problem for women with higher level of skills and high productivity potential; but for women with lower skills, especially those performing nonessential tasks, wage hikes that exceed their equilibrium wage pushes employers to let them go.
The firm survey does not have detailed information education of non-production workers by gender. Fortunately, the household survey does. Figure 10 shows Evidence from around the world shows that firms factor in costs associated with benefits they provide women (e.g. maternity and family leave, maternity insurance coverage). They also factor costs for replacing women during longer work absences (Ruhm, 1998) .
f. Wage Rates of Production Workers and Non-production Workers
This section examines if changes in minimum wages have impacts on firms' wage rates. The relevant question is whether firms adjust their wages in response to minimum wages. One cannot fully rule out the issue of reverse causality because it is plausible that the government sets minimum wages to take into account the aggregate wage growth. In other words, higher minimum wages are because the aggregate wage is higher. Therefore, the estimates for the impact of minimum wages on the actual wage rates can be biased upward. But as explained before, it is very difficult to expect that all firms are coordinating the way in which they set their wages and one or a few minimum wage levels can not correspond to all firms' wage setting.
Thus results are interpreted as associations between minimum wages and firms' average wages.
As shown in Tables 6a and 6b, the coefficients for small firms and large firms are very different.
The two dependent variables of interest are log of real firm-average wages (in cash and in kind) per worker. The results for production workers are presented in table 7a, and the results for non-production workers are in table 7b. The list of other control variables is similar, except now log of firms' total employment (Total Employment) are also added.
Results reveal that in general, the association between minimum wages and firms' actual wages, for both production workers and non-production workers, is robust and significant. For production workers, a 10% increase in real minimum wages is associated with a 2.14% increase in wages in small firms, but only 1.1 % increase in wages in large firms. For non-production workers, a 10% increase in real minimum wages is associated with a 1.87% increase in wages in small firms, but only 1.15% in larger firms. The association between minimum wages and actual wages is significant, of large magnitude in small firms, but less so in larger firms. This suggests that wages in small firms are more sensitive to changes in minimum wages, which is consistent with the fact that on average, wages in small firms are significantly lower. In other words, small firms are more likely to raise their wages in response to an increase in minimum wages. 
g. Other Considerations
Note that the results in previous sections concern with the employment impacts of minimum wages within a firm. It does not entirely reflect the -multiplier‖ effect that minimum wage increases can generate. The multiplier effect refers to a possibility that with higher wages brought about by minimum wage increase, workers now have higher income and can afford a higher level of consumption. This in turn can generate higher demand for other goods and services, which potentially could induce the creation of new firms and raise the aggregate employment. Since the added employment of new firms is not captured in the panel regression framework, the multiplier effect is not entirely captured here. This channel is particularly relevant for low-skilled (and hence presumably poorer) workers because they are more likely credit-constrained, and hence have a higher marginal propensity to consume.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the wage and employment impact of minimum wage changes in Indonesia; the analysis focuses on understanding the effect on the manufacturing sector, which constitutes a formal component of the Indonesian labor force.
The paper finds that in the manufacturing sector, minimum wages have a clear and consistent negative employment effect on small firms while they have limited effects on large firms in the sector. Since there are many more small firms, the aggregate effect of the minimum wages is to have an overall negative effect on formal employment, i.e. they lead to job losses. But the negative effects are largely concentrated among labor intensive firms with unskilled or less skilled workers. This finding has implications beyond the manufacturing sector, especially because Indonesia, like many developing economies, has a large concentration of low-skilled workers employed in small firms. Thus, sharp raises of the minimum wage could prevent job creation and retention, and a reduction in formal employment. As shown in other countries, increases in the minimum wage without commensurate raises in worker productivity levels can lead to unemployment or increase informality among low-skill workers.
Results also show that non-production workers are even more vulnerable to minimum wage increases than production-workers. And the vulnerability is more accentuated for women than men. This result has implications for young workers who are likely to be overrepresented among non-production workers performing basic tasks, as well as workers in sectors of the economy where the concentration of non-production workers is higher. Industries such as wholesale and retail and tourism in the services sector for example, have high concentration of (women) non-production workers with low levels of skill.
As mentioned, the importance of skill levels came through very clearly in the analysis, where less educated workers are hit hardest when minimum wage hikes take place. On the other hand, better skilled workers (with a high school education and above) are not affected. The underlying problem is that in the case of low-skilled (or unskilled) workers, higher minimum wage levels likely exceed their level of productivity. Thus, increases in the minimum wage mean that small companies, which are those that employ these workers most often and have low capital intensity, have to lay off non-essential workers (or even recruit informal ones) to avoid going out of business. There does not seem to be substitutions of less educated workers by better educated ones. Instead, low skill workers are simply laid off by their employers.
Minimum wages are also found correlated with firms' average wages. They are more correlated with average wages in small firms than in large firms, which suggests that minimum wages are significantly more binding for small firms who indeed on average pay lower than large firms do.
There is no easy answer to addressing such differential impacts except to keep minimum wage levels well in tune with the entire economy, not just larger firms that tend to be overrepresented in tripartite decisions. Also, while some studies (and policymakers) have argued for multiple minimum wages (sectoral and even by firm size) because they could potentially be tailored to particular sectors, skills, and productivity levels, these authors caution against such a change.
Doing so would undoubtedly introduce considerable distortions to the market and policy and administrative complexity that can crowd-out any benefits associated with more flexibility.
The fact that this and other studies yield varying results regarding the effects of minimum wages on employment should not come as a surprise given that there are structural differences between countries and there is wide variation in the way minimum wage policy is designed and implemented. Thus, results from this and other analysis undertaken in other developing contexts should not be interpreted to indicate that minimum wages are bad under all circumstances; instead, the interpretation should be that the effect of a minimum wages on employment can be sensitive to the context in which it is implemented. Minimum wage 0.31 *** 0.231 *** 0.312 *** 0.219 *** 0.208 *** 0.142 *** 0.15 *** 0.243 *** (0.0249) (0.0321) (0.0257) (0.0326) (0.0211) (0.0288) (0.0471) (0.0657) Firm age 0.198 *** 0.203 *** 0.0158 *** 0.283 *** (0.00369) (0.00412) (0.00340) (0.00804) Foreign 0.00818 *** 0.00781 *** 0.0077 *** 0.000320 (0.000152) (0.000170) (0.000201) (0.000195) Export 0.00886 *** 0.00913 *** 0.00192 *** 0.000507 *** (0.000111) (0.000118) (0.000134) (0.000166) Government 0.0128 *** 0.0123 *** 0.00642 *** 0.00794 *** (0.000252) (0.000280) (0.000253) (0.000326) Value Added 0.384 *** 0.394 *** 0.259 *** 0.196 *** (0.00308) (0 
